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The Tour de Fraud: What Foreign Banks Can Learn
From the BNP Paribas Settlement
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 9, 1995, a U.S. college student studying abroad was
gravely wounded and subsequently died when a suicide bomber blew up
her bus in Israel.1 The bombing was carried out by the Shaqiqi faction
of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, a terrorist organization funded by the
Islamic Republic of Iran (“Iran”).2 Distraught over his daughter’s death,
Stephen Flatow filed a lawsuit against Iran.3 When Iran did not pay the
$250 million in damages awarded by the court, Mr. Flatow sought to
collect damages from the Alavi Foundation, a charity which he alleged
was a front for the Iranian government.4
A Manhattan district attorney investigated Mr. Flatow’s
accusation and discovered that Iran completely controlled the charity.5
An examination of the charity’s bank records did not reveal any
transactions with Iranian banks as the authorities had suspected, but
instead revealed transactions with Credit Suisse AG (“Credit Suisse”).6
As this information became public, whistleblowers came forward
providing more information about Credit Suisse’s illegal activities.7
The success of these whistleblowers led another whistleblower to
approach the Manhattan district attorney’s office with stories of BNP
Paribas, S.A.’s (“BNPP”) ties to Iran and the genocidal regime then in
power in Sudan.8 This man’s story would lead to the largest
prosecution of a foreign bank in U.S. history and the largest financial

1.

In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F.Supp.2d 31, 44 (D.D.C.

2009).
Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 308 F.3d 1065, 1066–67 (9th Cir. 2002).
Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F.Supp. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 1998).
Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Ben Protess, A Grieving Father Pulls a Thread That
Unravels BNPs Illegal Deals, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2014, at A1.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
2.
3.
4.
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penalty ever levied against a foreign bank.9
In June 2014, BNPP settled with the United States Department
of Justice (“DOJ”) and the New York Department of Financial Services
(“DFS”) for approximately $8.9 billion.10 Since BNPP is the largest
bank in France and fourth largest in the world by total assets, the
settlement is significant because of its potential effect on European and
global financial markets.11 This Note examines BNPP’s protracted and
deliberate violations of U.S. trade sanctions and analyzes why the
settlement was so large. The actions that led to the historic BNPP
settlement are: (1) trade sanctions violations at all levels of the
company, (2) deliberate attempts to hide continued illegal activity
during the investigation of other foreign banks, and (3) lack of
cooperation during the investigation of BNPP.12 This Note specifically
addresses BNPP’s prioritization of profit over compliance and its lack
of cooperation with regulators’ investigations.13 The goal of this Note is
to illuminate what other foreign banks can learn from BNPP’s actions.
This Note proceeds in five parts. Part II provides a brief
discussion of U.S. trade sanction law.14 Part III reviews three selected
foreign bank settlements prior to BNPP’s settlement.15 Part IV outlines
the BNPP case and the actions that lead to such a large sanction and
settlement.16 Part V discusses BNPP’s lack of cooperation and
compliance and how this affected the settlement.17 Part VI concludes
by examining the implications of the sanction and the lessons that
foreign banks can learn from BNPP’s actions.18

Id.
Id.
Maria Tor & Saad Sarfarz, Largest 100 Banks in the World, SNL DATA DISPATCH
(Dec. 23, 2013), https://www.snl.com/InteractiveX/Article.aspx?cdid=A-26316576-11566.
12. Paul L. Lee, Compliance Lessons from OFAC Case Studies—Part II, 131 BANKING
L. J. 717, 749 (2014).
13. The phrase “profit over compliance” is taken from a N.Y. TIMES article which
posits that one of the issues U.S. regulators want to change through prosecution is the
cultural issue of foreign companies putting profit over compliance. Ben Protess & Jessica
Silver-Greenberg, Repeat Offenses Are Suspected on Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2014,
at A1.
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part IV.
17. See infra Part V.
18. See infra Part VI.
9.
10.
11.
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II. U.S. TRADE SANCTION LAWS
In the last five years, there have been seven investigations of
banks for allegedly violating trade sanctions by failing to comply with
the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 (“TWEA”) and the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”).19 Passed
during World War I as a means to curtail the success of the Central
Powers,20 TWEA provides that:
[d]uring a time of war, the President may, through any
agency that he may designate, . . . investigate, regulate,
direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any
acquisition holding, withholding, use, transfer,
withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation
of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or
privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any
property in which any foreign country or a national
thereof has any interest, by any person, or with respect
to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States.21
TWEA’s broad language was supplemented with the passage of
IEEPA in 1977.22 IEEPA gives the President the power “to deal with
any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or
substantial part outside the United States, to the national security,
foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President
declares a national emergency with respect to such threat.”23 By
declaring a national emergency the President may investigate, regulate
and prohibit:

19. Paul L. Lee, Compliance Lessons From OFAC Case Studies—Part I, 131 BANKING
L. J. 657, 658 (2014).
20. “Central Powers” is the commonly accepted term used to describe the coalition of
forces fought by the United States during World War I, including Germany, AustriaHungary, the Ottoman Empire, and Bulgaria. M. Cherif Bassiouni, World War I: “The War
to End All Wars” and the Birth of a Handicapped International Criminal Justice System, 30
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 244, 245–46 (2002).
21. 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(1) (2012).
22. Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 228 (1984).
23. 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (2012).
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(i) any transactions in foreign exchange, (ii) transfers of
credit or payments between, by, through, or to any
banking institution, to the extent that such transfers or
payments involve any interest of any foreign country or
a national thereof, (iii) the importing or exporting of
currency or securities, by any person, or with respect to
any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States.24
IEEPA also directly states that “[i]t shall be unlawful for a
person to violate, attempt to violate, conspire to violate, or cause a
violation of any license, order, regulation, or prohibition issued under
this chapter.”25 While TWEA and IEEPA are not the only laws
covering trade sanctions, recent cases have been prosecuted under
TWEA, IEEPA, and the corresponding legislation from the State of
New York.26
The United States currently has issued economic sanctions
against twenty-six different entities, twenty of which are countries.27
The recent BNPP settlement involves transactions violating the
sanctions against Cuba,28 Sudan,29 and Iran.30 As a result of current
24. § 1702 (a)(1)(A)–(B).
25. § 1705(a) (emphasis added).
26. The relevant New York statutes are Penal Law § 175.05 and § 175.10 which

address the falsification of business records. These were the only NY related charges that
BNPP plead guilty to and refer to BNPP’s modification and falsification of information on
various types of financial transfer documents. Statement of Facts in Support of BNP
Paribas Plea Agreement ¶ 7, United States v. BNP Paribas, S.A., No. 14-CR-00460
(S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2014) [hereinafter BNPP Statement of Facts], available at
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2014/06/30/statement-of-facts.pdf.
27. Sanctions Programs and Country Information, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/Programs.aspx
(last
updated Feb. 6, 2015, 3:06 PM).
28. In 1960 and 1962, President John F. Kennedy issued executive orders declaring the
Cuban Government a threat to the U.S. These executive orders leveled economic sanctions
against the island nation that remain in place today. BNPP Statement of the Facts, supra
note 26, ¶ 11.
29. In November 1997, President Clinton invoked the power of the IEEPA and issued
an executive order imposing trade sanctions against the property and interests of the
Government of Sudan in the United States or within the possession or control of U.S.
persons. Exec. Order No. 13,067, 3 C.F.R. 59989 (1997). President Bush also employed
the executive powers of the IEEPA, strengthening these sanctions in October 2006. Exec.
Order No. 13412, 3 C.F.R. 61369 (2006).
30. In March 1995, President Clinton, through the IEEPA, issued Executive Order
12957 and commenced economic sanctions against the Government of Iran. Subsequent
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trade sanctions, there is a virtually complete prohibition of trade and
investment activities involving the U.S. financial system in these
countries.31 The processing of U.S. dollar transactions is included in the
prohibition.32 Enforcement of trade sanctions falls to the Department of
Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (“OFAC”).33 Trade
sanctions are enforced through a variety of penalties authorized by
IEEPA and TWEA. IEEPA allows for both civil and criminal penalties
that carry fines as high as $250,000 per transaction or a maximum fine
of $1,000,000 respectively.34 TWEA authorizes civil penalties of up to
$65,000 for each transaction.35 Beyond these statutes, many of the
country-specific sanctions set up by Congress contain express
provisions governing enforcement and penalties.36
III. FOREIGN BANK TROUBLES WITH U.S. SANCTION LAWS
The complex financial regulatory scheme employed by U.S.
regulators has been a source of consternation and litigation for foreign
banks with branches inside the United States37 One of the primary
reasons for this difficulty seems to be the cultural differences on the
issue of economic sanctions between the United States and European
banks.38 The Executive Vice President of the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York explained this issue by saying, “[foreign] institutions looked
executive orders, and regulations issued by OFAC, prohibited substantially all trade and
investment activities between the U.S. and Iranian entities. Id. ¶ 8; see also 31 C.F.R. pt.
560 (2014). Until November 2008, the only transactions financial institutions could conduct
on behalf of Iranian entities were “U-Turn” transactions. A “U-Turn” transaction requires
the transaction start at an off-shore non-Iranian bank and only pass through the U.S. on the
way to another non-Iranian foreign bank. Order Pursuant to Banking Law § 39 at 6–8, In re
Standard Chartered Bank, New York Branch, N.Y. Dep’t of Fin. Servs. (Aug. 6, 2012)
[hereinafter Standard Chartered, Order Pursuant to Banking Law § 39], available
at http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/ea/ea120806.pdf.
31. BNPP Statement of the Facts, supra note 26, ¶¶ 3–13.
32. Id. ¶ 14.
33. Settlement Agreement ¶ 1, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury and HSBC Holdings PLC
(Dec. 11, 2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/CivPen
/Documents/121211_HSBC_Settlement.pdf [hereinafter Settlement Agreement, HSBC].
34. 50 U.S.C. § 1705 (2012).
35. Frequently Asked Questions and Answers, OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSET CONTROL,
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/faqs/Sanctions/Pages/answer.aspx#12.
36. See generally 31 C.F.R. § 560.701 (2014).
37. See Lee, Part I, supra note 19, at 659.
38. Lee, Part II, supra note 12, at 764.
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at [U.S.] economic sanctions very differently [than U.S. institutions].
They looked at economic sanctions as technical ‘American’ rules that
were not seen as consistent with the organization’s and the home
country’s larger value system.”39
Before the BNPP settlement in June 2014, the DOJ and DFS
prosecuted and settled with three other foreign banks—Credit Suisse,
HSBC Holdings (“HSBC Group”), and Standard Chartered Bank
(“Standard Chartered”).40 While the settlements in these three cases
were large, none compared to BNPP’s roughly $9 billion settlement.41
Understanding the facts of these cases provides a comparison to the
actions of BNPP and how U.S. regulators addressed BNPP’s trade
sanction violations.
A.

Credit Suisse

In 2009, Credit Suisse forfeited $536 million for violating the
IEEPA and New York State laws, at the time the largest settlement in
history.42 Credit Suisse’s violations began in 1995 when it modified wire
transfers from Iranian and Sudanese clients to avoid U.S. regulators.43
Credit Suisse helped its clients who were subject to sanctions clear
hundreds of millions of dollars through the U.S. financial system by
removing material information, such as names and bank information,
from wire transfers and training clients to falsify wire transfers.44
Under review of its leadership, Credit Suisse purposefully
39. Thomas C. Baxter, Exec. Vice President and Gen. Counsel, Fed. Reserve Bank of
N.Y., Remarks at “The New Compliance Landscape: Increasing Roles – Increasing Risks”
Conference
(Jul.
23,
2014)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.ny.frb.org/newsevents/speeches/2014/bax072314.html).
40. In addition to the settlements with the aforementioned banks, the DOJ has also
settled with ABN AMRO Bank N.V., Lloyds TSB Bank PLC, Barclays Bank PLC, Tokyo–
Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd., and The Royal Bank of Scotland for similar violations of trade
sanction laws. Credit Suisse, HSBC Holdings, and Standard Chartered were selected for
comparison because of the similarity of the violations and size of penalty. Lee, Part II,
supra note 12, at 717.
41. Lee, Part I, supra note 19, at 674-75.
42. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Credit Suisse Agrees to Forfeit $536 Million
in Connection with Violations of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and
New York State Law (Dec. 16, 2009) [hereinafter Press Release, Credit Suisse], available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/December/09-ag-1358.html.
43. Id.
44. Factual Statement in Support of Credit Suisse Deferred Prosecution Agreement ¶¶
5–6, United States v. Credit Suisse AG, No. CR-09-352 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2009) [hereinafter
Credit Suisse Factual
Statement],
available
at
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put this system in place in order to help increase current and future
business with Iranian entities.45 In 1998, to protect the New York
branch of Credit Suisse and Iranian clients, the company reorganized
and transferred all activities pertaining to Iran away from the New York
office to other Credit Suisse branches or other non-affiliated U.S.
banks.46 After successfully moving Iranian transactions away from the
New York branch and U.S. regulators, Credit Suisse published a
pamphlet for Iranian clients entitled, “[h]ow to transfer USD
payments.”47 In the pamphlet, Credit Suisse explained how to
circumvent OFAC filters and prevent U.S. government investigations.48
While Credit Suisse intentionally tried to deceive U.S.
regulators about its transactions on behalf of Iranian clients, its
cooperation after terminating these relationships helped lessen the
penalty handed down by OFAC.49 When asked by the DOJ for
information and assistance in its investigation, Credit Suisse provided
all the relevant information possible and discontinued the illegal
activities.50 Moreover, Credit Suisse conducted its own internal
investigation into U.S. dollar-clearing services for Specially Designated
Nationals (“SDNs”)51 and a six-year review of incoming and outgoing
Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication
(“SWIFT”)52 payments.53 The DOJ noted the concerted efforts by
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/documents/12-16-09-CreditSuisse-factualstatement.pdf.
45. Press Release, Credit Suisse, supra note 42.
46. Credit Suisse Factual Statement, supra note 44, ¶ 22.
47. Press Release, Credit Suisse, supra note 42.
48. Credit Suisse Factual Statement, supra note 44, ¶ 24.
49. See id. ¶ 57–58.
50. Id. ¶ 58.
51. The U.S. Dep’t of Treasury defines SDNs as “individuals and companies owned or
controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, targeted countries. [The SDN list also includes]
individuals, groups, and entities, such as terrorists and narcotics traffickers designated under
programs that are not country-specific.” OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSET CONTROL, supra note
35.
52. SWIFT messages are the standard messages used in various types of bank transfers.
For this Note, only SWIFT MT 202 and 103 messages are relevant as they were the SWIFT
messages most often modified by the banks. SWIFT MT 202 is the standard message used
for bank-to-bank credit transfers. SWIFT MT 103 is the standard message for cross-border
customer credit transfers. These messages require information on the originating party and
the beneficiary of the payment. MT 202 messages do not require any disclosure of
information about originator or beneficiary of the payment. Lee, Part I, supra note 19, at
667.
53. Credit Suisse Factual Statement, supra note 44, ¶ 58; see also Press Release, Credit
Suisse, supra note 42.
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Credit Suisse in identifying mistakes and rectifying the problem, since
discovering it in 2006.54 On its own accord, Credit Suisse changed its
corporate policies, designated employees with the sole purpose of
monitoring compliance with U.S. sanctions programs, added U.S.
sanctions materials to training for new employees, and implemented
new filters for screening transactions.55
B.

HSBC Group’s Violations and Settlement

In December 2012, approximately three years after the Credit
Suisse settlement, HSBC Group settled with the DOJ for $1.256 billion
for violating the IEEPA and TWEA.56 The actions that led to the HSBC
Group settlement began when HSBC Group helped customers
circumvent sanctions imposed on them by OFAC.57 Specifically, from
the mid-1990s through 2006, HSBC Group processed over $600 million
in transactions for these customers by omitting names from payment
messages, removing information identifying sanctioned countries, and
utilizing cover payments to avoid detection by bank filters.58
Compliance officers at the U.S. branch of HSBC Group voiced
concerns about the use of cover payments and other methods used to
In 2005, HSBC Group
shield OFAC sanctioned countries.59
Compliance issued a policy prohibiting all HSBC affiliates from
processing U.S. dollar transactions that were prohibited by OFAC.60
Despite the issuance of this policy, the transactions continued to occur.61
Once the U.S. regulators’ investigation began, HSBC Group closed U.S.
dollar accounts of Burmese, Cuban, and Sudanese affiliate banks at all
affiliate locations, in addition to terminating and prohibiting all new

Press Release, Credit Suisse, supra note 42.
Credit Suisse Factual Statement, supra note 44, ¶¶ 57–58.
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, HSBC Holdings Plc. and HSBC Bank USA
N.A. Admit to Anti-Money Laundering and Sanctions Violations, Forfeit $1.256 Billion in
Deferred Prosecution Agreement (Dec. 11, 2012) [hereinafter Press Release, HSBC
Holdings], available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/hsbc-holdings-plc-and-hsbc-bankusa-na-admit-anti-money-laundering-and-sanctions-violations.
57. HSBC conducted transactions on behalf of Cuba, Iran, Libya, Sudan, and Burma
(Myanmar). Id.
58. Id.
59. Settlement Agreement, HSBC, supra note 33, ¶¶ 5–7.
60. Id. ¶ 10.
61. Id. ¶ 11.
54.
55.
56.
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business with Iranian customers.62 OFAC noted in the settlement
agreement with HSBC Group that HSBC Group had conducted its own
internal review of transactions and had provided written statements
about transactions that appeared to have violated sanction laws.63
OFAC also noted how HSBC Group responded promptly to OFAC’s
requests for information and provided substantial and well-organized
material so as to aid in its investigation.64
C.

Standard Chartered’s Violations and Settlement

Later in December 2012, the DOJ entered into a $227 million
settlement with Standard Chartered for IEEPA violations.65 Standard
Chartered came under investigation by the DOJ, OFAC, and DFS for
allegedly conducting U.S. dollar transactions on behalf of Iranian,
Sudanese, Libyan, and Burmese entities.66 In order to ensure that the
transactions cleared bank regulators, Standard Chartered employed the
following techniques: changing the banking code in payment messages;
deleting payment data that revealed the identity of sanctioned entities;
and replacing the name of sanctioned entities with special characters.67
The New York office of Standard Chartered processed millions of these
U.S. dollar-clearing transactions for sanctioned countries, but did not
tamper with the transactions.68 The tampering primarily took place in
the London and Dubai offices of Standard Chartered, where senior
corporate management and compliance officials in London knew and
approved of these activities.69
Senior global management knew of Standard Chartered’s illegal

62. Id. ¶ 28.
63. Id. ¶ 29.
64. Id.
65. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Standard Chartered Bank Agrees to Forfeit

$227 Million for Illegal Transactions with Iran, Sudan, Libya, and Burma (Dec. 10, 2012)
[hereinafter
Press
Release,
Standard
Chartered],
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/December/12-crm-1467.html.
66. Id.
67. Standard Chartered, Order Pursuant to Banking Law § 39, supra note 30, at 2.
68. Press Release, Standard Chartered, supra note 65.
69. Id.; see also Standard Chartered, Order Pursuant to Banking Law § 39, supra note
60, at 8 (“[Standard Chartered’s] success in U.S. dollar-clearing for Iranian Clients stems
from the documented willingness of its most senior management to deceive regulators and
violate U.S. law. Worse yet, [Standard Chartered] apparently adopted this strategy with full
knowledge of the risks involved.”).
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transactions on behalf of sanctioned clients and eventually disclosed the
violations to OFAC.70 As early as 2007 and before
OFAC’s
investigation even began, Standard Chartered terminated its existing
business with sanctioned parties and prohibited new business with
them.71 After the investigation began, Standard Chartered cooperated
fully by conducting a historical review of its transactions, providing
information on apparent violations, and waiving attorney-client
privilege in order to provide additional relevant information.72 Upon
settling with Standard Chartered, New York County District Attorney
Cyrus Vance, Jr. remarked that “[t]hese cases give teeth to sanctions
enforcement, send a strong message about the need for transparency in
international banking, and ultimately contribute to the fight against
money laundering and terror financing.”73
D.

European Banks and U.S. Sanction Laws

Because there were no parallel European sanctions in place for
the banks discussed above, the U.S. sanctions were simply without
merit.74 Additionally, many banks did not understand how the U.S.
sanctions applied to their transactions, since they were only connected
to the United States through the clearing of U.S. dollar transactions.75
While this excuse was viewed as plausible for some time, the
prevalence of U.S. regulators’ actions concerning U.S. dollar-clearing
transactions since 2005 and the revelation that many banks sought U.S.
counsel’s opinion on the issue casts a shadow over this excuse.76 The
reason these banks all conducted U.S. dollar-clearing transactions is

70. Settlement Agreement at 6, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury and Standard Chartered
Bank (Dec. 10, 2012) [hereinafter Settlement Agreement, Standard Chartered Bank],
available
at
http://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/sanctions/CivPen/Documents/121210_SCB_Settlement.pdf.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Press Release, Standard Chartered, supra note 65.
74. Baxter, supra note 39.
75. See Lee, Part I, supra note 19, at 658-59.
76. The first actions against banks for trade sanction violations in the modern era
occurred in 2005 with ABN AMRO Bank N.V. Id. at 659. See generally Standard
Chartered Bank, Order Pursuant to Banking Law § 39, supra note 30, at 11 (detailing how
Standard Chartered sought outside counsel on the issue of evading U.S. sanction law);
BNPP Statement of the Facts, supra note 26, at ¶ 30 (detailing how BNPP sought outside
counsel on the issue of OFAC sanctions and compliance).
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because the U.S. dollar serves as the leading currency for international
trade and debt denomination.77 It was not until they were investigated
by the DOJ that these banks understood the true commitment of U.S.
regulators to U.S. sanction laws.
IV. THE BNPP SETTLEMENT
BNPP settled with the U.S. government and the State of New
York for approximately $8.9 billion.78 In addition to the financial
penalties, BNPP was required to terminate thirteen employees and
implement a one-year suspension of all U.S. dollar-clearing operations
for the business lines that caused the misconduct.79 The actions of
BNPP come under both state and federal jurisdiction because there is a
branch office of BNPP headquartered in New York, New York.80
One of BNPP’s core international business lines, and one of the
lines involved in the misconduct, is its Corporate Investment Bank
(“CIB”).81 The CIB came under scrutiny because it provided certain
sanctioned clients with syndicated loans and letters of credit to aid in
financing.82 In support of these operations, BNPP operates numerous
business lines, including the Energy Commodities Export Project
(“ECEP”).83 The ECEP focuses on providing financing related to oil,
petroleum gas, and other commodities.84
77. See Linda Goldberg, What is the Status of the International Roles of the Dollar?,
FOR
ECON.
POLICY
RESEARCH
(Mar.
31,
2010),
VOX
CTR.
http://www.voxeu.org/article/dollar-s-international-roles; Thierry Bracke & Irina Bunda,
Exchange Rate Anchoring—Is there Still a De Facto US Dollar Standard? 31 (Jun. 3, 2011)
(European
Central
Bank
Working
Paper
No.
1353),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1857395.
78. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, BNP Paribas Agrees to Plead Guilty and to
Pay $8.9 Billion for Illegally Processing Financial Transactions for Countries Subject to
U.S. Economic Sanctions (June 30, 2014) [hereinafter Press Release, BNP Paribas],
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bnp-paribas-agrees-plead-guilty-and-pay-89billion-illegally-processing-financial.
79. Id.
80. BNPP Statement of the Facts, supra note 26, ¶¶ 1–2; see also Consent Order Under
New York Banking Law § 44 at 1, In re BNP Paribas, S.A., New York Branch, N.Y. Dep’t
of Fin. Servs. (Sept. 21, 2012) [hereinafter BNP Paribas, Consent Order under New York
Banking Law § 44], available at
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/ea/ea140630.pdf.
81. BNPP Statement of the Facts, supra note 26, ¶ 1.
82. BNP Paribas, Consent Order Under New York Banking Law § 44, supra note 80,
at 11.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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As a financial institution operating inside the United States,
“BNPP [is] prohibited from participating in certain
financial
transactions for persons, entities, and countries subject to various U.S.
economic sanctions.”85 The majority of prohibited transactions involve
SDNs, which consist of individuals and companies that have their assets
blocked from entry into the U.S. financial system.86 SDN assets are
blocked because they are either owned, controlled, or acting on behalf
of specific countries, individuals, groups, or entities against which the
United States has leveled sanctions.87 In BNPP’s case, the sanctioned
countries at issue are Cuba, Sudan, and Iran.88
BNPP’s illicit activities began as far back as 1997 and continued
through 2012.89 During this time, BNPP conspired with and used other
banks and financial entities located in or controlled by Sudan, Cuba, and
Iran in order to move approximately $8.9 billion in total through the
U.S. financial system on behalf of the sanctioned entities.90 During the
fifteen years of BNPP’s illicit activity, the conspiracy to benefit the
sanctioned countries was conducted in numerous ways including: cover
payments,91 manipulation of information,92 and the use of satellite
banks.93
A.

BNPP’s Violations with Regard to Sudan

BNPP created an elaborate system of information manipulation
and satellite banks in order to help the Sudanese regime.94 The
relationship between Sudan and BNPP began after the United States
enacted sanctions against Sudan in 1997, as BNPP became the sole
correspondent bank for Sudan in Europe.95 In this role, BNPP held U.S.
dollar accounts for Sudan and allowed it to process U.S. dollar
85. BNPP Statement of the Facts, supra note 26, ¶ 2.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. ¶¶ 3, 8, 11.
89. Id. ¶¶ 14, 19.
90. Id. ¶ 14 (representing the total amount of money that the DOJ could determine

conclusively that BNPP transacted on behalf of the sanctioned parties).
91. Id. ¶ 16.
92. Id.
93. Id. ¶ 18.
94. Id. ¶¶ 17–18.
95. Id. ¶ 19.
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transactions in addition to developing credit for its banks.96 Since at
least 2002, BNPP served as the “de facto” bank of the Government of
Sudan.97 BNPP became one of the key financiers of Sudan’s oil
industry by providing 90% of the letters of credit in U.S. dollars, which
helped to build that industry.98 Through BNPP Geneva, BNPP
conspired with numerous Sudanese banks and entities as well as
financial institutions outside Sudan to violate the U.S. sanctions and
provide Sudanese banks and entities access to the U.S. financial
system.99 In 2003, a senior compliance officer from BNPP Paris told
CIB executives that the Geneva office was using cover payments to
prevent U.S. investigators from discovering Sudanese transactions.100
These cover payments required BNPP to modify payment messages
from Sudanese entities.101 For example, BNPP Geneva wrote
instructions to personnel and sanctioned parties stating, “Do not list in
any case the name of Sudanese entities on messages transmitted to
American banks or to foreign banks installed in the U.S.”102
Another strategy used by BNPP was employing a network of
artificially constructed satellite banks that received funds from
Sudanese banks in order to mask the transactions on BNPP’s books.103
These satellite banks contained accounts specifically used for U.S.
dollar transactions, as was made clear by the account opening
documents’ statement: “As requested, we hereby confirm that we wish
to open the account to facilitate transfers of funds for our mutual

Id.
Kara Scannell, Payback for BNP, Sudan’s ‘De Facto’ Bank, FIN. TIMES, (July 1,
2014, 12:12
AM)
(quoting
James
Cole,
a
senior
DOJ
official),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/64073d84-00a6-11e4-9a6200144feab7de.html?siteedition=intl#axzz3EphPufQ7.
98. BNPP Statement of the Facts, supra note 26, ¶ 19.
99. Id. ¶ 17.
100. Id. ¶ 27.
101. Id. ¶ 22.
102. BNP Paribas, Consent Order under New York Banking Law § 44, supra note 80, at
6.
103. BNPP Statement of the Facts, supra note 26, ¶ 23–24. BNPP developed a two-step
process with the regional banks to ensure that no connection could be made to Sudanese
entities. First the Sudanese bank would transfer the money to BNPP Geneva and an account
specially held by the satellite bank for U.S. dollar transactions. Next, the satellite bank
transferred the money through a U.S. bank without any reference to the Sudanese bank.
This process meant that all of the transactions looked like they were coming from satellite
bank as opposed to a Sudanese bank. BNP Paribas, Consent Order under New York
Banking Law § 44, supra note 80, at 7.
96.
97.
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Sudanese customers.”104 BNPP leadership recognized the advantages of
the satellite banks to Sudanese transactions and believed the banks had a
“significant commercial potential, not only in connection with
Sudan.”105 This practice of passing payment through various steps and
layers to obscure the origination of the transaction as well as the party
involved is called fronting.106
The majority of these transactions were conducted on behalf of
a financial institution owned by the Government of Sudan.107 In May
2007, OFAC officials and BNPP New York executives discussed the
issue of BNPP Geneva conducting U.S. dollar business with Sudan.108
OFAC requested that BNPP begin an internal investigation of
transactions with Sudan and report back to OFAC.109 The investigation
led to the cessation of BNPP U.S. dollar-clearing transactions for
Sudan, but not before approximately $6.4 billion in transactions were
processed through BNPP New York.110
B.

BNPP’s Violations with Regard to Cuba

BNPP employed a similar system of satellite banks and
information manipulation to assist sanctioned Cuban entities in
conducting U.S. dollar-clearing transactions.111 From 2000 to 2010, the
Paris headquarters of BNPP processed U.S. dollar-clearing transactions
for Cuban entities in violation of U.S. sanctions against Cuba.112 BNPP
manipulated and changed messages on transactions in order to keep
them from being blocked by U.S. regulators and participated in eight
“Cuban Credit Facilities.”113 These Cuban Credit Facilities were
protected from detection by a fronting scheme approved by BNPP
104.

BNP Paribas, Consent Order under New York Banking Law § 44, supra note 80, at

7.
105. BNPP Statement of the Facts, supra note 26, ¶ 38.
106. Id. ¶ 53.
107. BNP Paribas, Consent Order Under New York Banking Law § 44, supra note 80,

at 6.
BNPP Statement of the Facts, supra note 26, ¶ 40.
Id.
Id. ¶ 41; see also BNP Paribas, Consent Order Under New York Banking Law §
44, supra note 80, at 6.
111. Id. ¶ 50.
112. Id. ¶ 49.
113. “Cuban Credit Facilities” provided financing for Cuban entities wanting to do U.S.
dollar business with Cuban entities. Id. ¶ 50.
108.
109.
110.
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compliance officers.114 The fronting scheme involved manipulation of
transfers by Cuban entities by removing any mention of Cuba or a
related entity, so as to not only avoid detection by U.S. regulators, but
also by BNPP New York’s screening system.115 ECEP employees at
BNPP Paris purposefully excluded references to Cuba and had other
banks do the same in order to ensure the transactions were not halted
because of sanctions.116 When three transactions were blocked for
referencing Cuba, BNPP employees stripped all the references to Cuba
and combined the transactions into one transaction in order to fool
regulators into thinking the three original transactions were an unrelated
new single transaction.117 In total, BNPP conducted at least $1.747
billion in U.S. dollar transactions on behalf of Cuban entities.118
C.

BNPP’s Violations with Regard to Iran

BNPP created and executed a specific plan to help Iranian
entities circumvent U.S. sanctions.119 In 1995, BNPP circulated a
memorandum to staff with directions for U.S. dollar denominated
transactions involving Iranian clients.120 The memorandum told
employees, “Do not stipulate in any case the name of Iranian entities on
messages transmitted to American banks or to foreign banks installed in
the U.S.A.”121
Beginning in 2006, BNPP transacted payments on behalf of an
Iranian client (“Iranian Controlled Company 1”) regarding three letters
of credit.122 Iranian Controlled Company 1 was controlled by an Iranian
energy group based in Tehran, Iran (“Iranian Energy Group 1”).123
114. Id.; see also BNP Paribas, Consent Order Under New York Banking Law, supra
note 80, at 13 (detailing the actions under taken by Cuban Credit Facilities which were very
similar to the satellite banks set up to hide transactions on behalf of Sudanese clients).
115. BNPP Statement of the Facts, supra note 26, ¶ 54.
116. Id.
117. Id. ¶ 56.
118. Id. ¶ 49.
119. BNP Paribas, Consent Order Under New York Banking Law § 44, supra note 80,
at 10–11.
120. Id. at 3–4.
121. Id. at 4. This memorandum was later followed up with a policy directive entitled,
Operating Application for Filtering of Transactions Under the Group Policy on Iran. Id. at
10–11.
122. BNPP Statement of the Facts, supra note 26, ¶ 42.
123. Id.
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BNPP knew that Iranian Controlled Company 1 was owned entirely by
Iranian Energy Group 1, which was owned outright by an Iranian
citizen.124 At the time of Iranian Controlled Company 1’s first
transactions, they were not illegal under “U-Turn” provisions.125
However, in November 2008, with the renewal of sanctions against Iran,
the transactions conducted on behalf of Iranian Controlled Company 1
became illegal.126 Despite the change in the law, BNPP continued to
clear U.S. dollar transactions for the client through November 2012,
after OFAC’s investigation had begun.127
V. WHY THE BNPP SETTLEMENT WAS SO HIGH
When BNPP and the DOJ reached a $8.9 billion settlement in
June 2014, it was the highest banking settlement in history.128 As of
publication of this Note, the BNPP settlement is currently the highest
settlement for a violation of U.S. trade sanctions.129 Because HSBC
Group, Standard Chartered, and Credit Suisse made mistakes similar to
those made by BNPP, the rationale for an exponentially higher
settlement merits investigation. Although Standard Chartered, HSBC
Group, and Credit Suisse were all found to be doing the same types of
activities as BNPP, none of those banks exhibited the emphasis on
profit over compliance or lack of cooperation that BNPP did when the
investigation began.
A.

Lack of Compliance with U.S. Sanction Laws

BNPP’s disregard for U.S. sanctions stemmed from a desire to
maintain existing relationships with and cash flows from clients in

124.
125.

Id. ¶ 43.
Id. ¶ 44. The U-Turn Provision or Exception was a statutory allowance for U.S.
banks to process certain U.S. dollar transactions involving Iran. U.S. banks and branches of
foreign banks’ U.S. offices could process dollar payments involving Iran if the payment
started and ended with a non-Iranian bank outside of the U.S. The U-Turn Provision was
created in 1995 but was repealed in November 2008. Lee, Part I, supra note 19, at 663-64.
126. BNPP Statement of the Facts, supra note 26, ¶ 44.
127. Id.
128. See Lee, Part I, supra note 19, at 657.
129. Kevin McCoy, Banks Face Intensified Sanctions Probes in U.S., USA TODAY (July
9,
2014),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/07/09/banks-ussanctions/12354389/.
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Sudan, Iran, and Cuba.130 BNPP’s elevation of profits over the rule of
law is exemplified in an email from BNPP management that
summarized a meeting to discuss concerns over processing U.S. dollar
transactions for Sudanese SDNs.131 The email stated that “The
relationship with this body of [Sudanese] counterparties is a historical
one and the commercial stakes are significant. For these reasons,
Compliance does not want to stand in the way of maintaining this
activity for ECEP and [BNPP Geneva].”132 The preference given to
commercial priorities over U.S. sanctions illustrates a deep apathy for
sanction laws and what they seek to accomplish. Another example of
the disregard shown by BNPP’s leadership towards U.S. sanctions came
in 2005 after a compliance employee at BNPP Geneva warned: “As I
understand it, we have a number of Arab Banks (nine identified) on our
books that only carry out clearing transactions for Sudanese banks in
dollars . . . . This practice effectively means that we are circumventing
the US embargo on transactions in [U.S. dollars] by Sudan.”133
Other high-ranking BNPP Geneva employees voiced the same
concern while others explained that these types of transactions “had
received the full support of our General Management in Paris.”134 An
extreme example of the disregard for U.S. sanctions was seen at a
meeting of senior compliance officers from BNPP Geneva and BNPP
executives, including the Chief Operating Officer.135 At this meeting
the same concerns about U.S. sanctions against Sudan were summarily
dismissed by a senior BNPP executive who requested that no minutes of
the meeting be recorded.136
In March 2007, another senior BNPP compliance officer
reminded other high-level BNPP compliance and legal employees that
certain Sudanese banks BNPP dealt with, “play a pivotal part in the
support of the Sudanese government which . . . has hosted Osama Bin
Laden and refuses the [U.N.] intervention in Darfur.”137 Later, in May
Lee, Part II, supra note 12, at 750.
BNPP Statement of the Facts, supra note 26, ¶ 37.
Id.
Id. ¶ 32; see also BNP Paribas, Consent Order Under New York Banking Law §
44, supra note 80, at 8.
134. BNPP Statement of the Facts, supra note 26, ¶ 32.
135. BNP Paribas, Consent Order Under New York Banking Law § 44, supra note 80,
at 9; see also BNPP Statement of the Facts, supra note 26, ¶ 33.
136. BNPP Statement of the Facts, supra note 26, ¶ 33.
137. Id. ¶ 20.
130.
131.
132.
133.
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2007, a BNPP executive with responsibilities for compliance across all
BNPP branches warned in a memorandum that “In a context where the
International Community puts pressure to bring an end to the dramatic
situation in Darfur, no one would understand why [BNPP] persists [in
Sudan] which could be interpreted as supporting the leaders in place.”138
While the actions at the executive level are troubling, it is the
pervasiveness of the conspiracy that seems to merit such a high
punishment. Investigations into BNPP’s actions with regard to Sudan
revealed that employees would frequently flag transactions from Sudan
and note names, accounts, and other vital information that needed
changing in order to specifically circumvent U.S. sanctions.139
The disregard for compliance with U.S. laws encompassed
actions at all levels of BNPP that not only supported transactions for
Sudan, but also Iran. In early 2010, the New York County District
Attorney’s Office and the DOJ questioned BNPP about conducting
transactions on behalf of sanctioned entities, specifically Iran.140 BNPP
agreed to conduct an internal investigation and cooperate with the
authorities; however, it continued clearing transactions for an Iranian
company referred to by the DOJ as Iranian Controlled Company 1.141
While some BNPP employees may not have been aware that Iranian
Controlled Company 1 was in fact owned by an Iranian national, in late
2011 and early 2012 red flags arose making it clear that this client was
Iranian.142 Several other European banks blocked payments and
transactions by Iranian Controlled Company 1 on the basis that it was
“controlled from Iran.”143 In the year after Iranian Controlled Company
1 was blocked by other European banks, BNPP processed
approximately $586.1 million in U.S. dollar transactions for the
Company.144 Additionally, in June 2012, a BNPP compliance officer
noticed that Iranian Controlled Company 1 was transferring money
from its BNPP account to an Indian Bank (“Indian Bank 1”) with
known links to Iran.145 According to the Statement of the Facts issued
138. Id.
139. Id. ¶ 22.
140. Id. ¶ 45.
141. Id.
142. Id. ¶ 46.
143. Id.
144. Id. ¶ 47.
145. Id. ¶ 46.
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by the DOJ and BNPP, “despite these warnings—and despite claiming
to be cooperating fully with the Government’s investigation into
sanctions violations—BNPP continued to process U.S. dollar
transactions for Iranian Controlled Company 1 until November
2012.”146
B.

Lack of Cooperation with Investigation

The second key difference between BNPP’s actions and those of
Standard Chartered, HSBC, and Credit Suisse, is BNPP’s lack of
cooperation with the DOJ’s investigations. The conspiracy to cover up
transactions from SDNs permeated all levels of BNPP and implicated
personnel in varied roles from multiple branches.147 Everyone from
employees processing payments from SDNs to the highest level of
corporate compliance and governance knew about the dollar-clearing
transactions and worked to keep the lucrative operation going.148 For
instance, Credit Suisse provided the DOJ with relevant information for
the investigation and did not continue the illegal activities while under
investigation. 149 Additionally, Credit Suisse began its own internal
investigation into U.S. dollar-clearing services for SDNs and an indepth review of ingoing and outgoing SWIFT payments.150 The DOJ
noted the concerted efforts by Credit Suisse, since discovering the
problem in 2006, to not only identify the violations, but also rectify the
problems.151
In contrast, BNPP was aware as early as 1997 of the illegal
nature of some of the transactions it was conducting on behalf of certain
clients.152 BNPP received various legal opinions confirming the
illegality of these transactions, yet despite those opinions, the
transactions continued to occur.153 In 2004, the Federal Reserve Bank
Id.
Federal documents indicate that BNPP’s illicit activities stemmed from the Geneva
and Paris offices and include actions by personnel ranging from senior management making
policy decisions for the organization to tellers who pulled and edited the message on cover
payments. BNPP Statement of the Facts, supra note 26, ¶¶ 22, 27.
148. Id.
149. Credit Suisse Factual Statement, supra note 44, ¶¶ 57–58.
150. Id.; see also Press Release, Credit Suisse, supra note 42.
151. Press Release, Credit Suisse, supra note 42.
152. BNPP Statement of the Facts, supra note 26, ¶ 19.
153. Id. ¶ 70.
146.
147.
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of New York (“FRB-NY”) and DFS informed BNPP that they had
“identified systemic failures in BNPP’s compliance with the Bank
Secrecy Act, and specifically highlighted deficiencies in [the New York
branch]’s monitoring of transactions with overseas clients.”154 BNPP
entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) with FRB-NY
and DFS that required “that BNPP New York improve its system for
compliance with U.S. banking secrecy and sanctions laws.”155 Instead
of complying with the MOU, BNPP continued to hide violations from
regulators.156 Internal documents reveal that even after being informed
of the illegal conduct, compliance and legal staff supported the conduct
instead of reporting it as required by the MOU.157
Not long after entering into the MOU, senior executives from
BNPP Paris and executives from BNPP Geneva met and discussed
current U.S. embargoes against specific nations and the impact of those
sanctions on BNPP’s business with those countries.158 As a result of
this discussion, BNPP switched the processing of transactions involving
payments to U.S. sanctioned countries from locations in these
sanctioned countries to a non-affiliated bank in the United States (“U.S.
Bank 1”).159 After shifting their illegal actions away from the New
York branch of BNPP in 2004, many in the company thought BNPP did
not need to worry about U.S. sanction laws.160 This belief, based on the
legal opinion of a U.S. law firm (“U.S. Law Firm 1”), was wrong.161 In
2006, BNPP received a second opinion from another U.S. law firm
(“U.S. Law Firm 2”) that clarified the errors of U.S. Law Firm 1. The
opinion explained that sanctions still applied to BNPP despite using
U.S. Bank 1 and that U.S. authorities were “sensitive to the use of
‘cover payments’ by foreign banks that omitted underlying details about
the nature of transactions” and the parties involved.162 In response to
154.
155.
156.

Id. ¶ 28.
Id.
BNP Paribas, Consent Order Under New York Banking Law § 44, supra note 80,

at 16.
Id.
BNPP Statement of the Facts, supra note 26, ¶ 29.
The Statement of the Facts does not identify the non-affiliated bank that BNPP
used for these transactions. See id.
160. Id. ¶ 30.
161. Id. (documenting the history between BNPP and its legal counsel, but never
disclosing the names of the law firms or the Iranian companies in question).
162. Id. ¶ 35.
157.
158.
159.
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U.S. Law Firm 2’s legal advice and revised reports from U.S. Law Firm
1, BNPP issued a policy that stated, “If a transaction is denominated in
[U.S. dollars], financial institutions outside the United States must take
American sanctions into account when processing their transactions.”163
Despite this policy, BNPP continued to obscure information in order to
process U.S. dollar transactions for clients subject to U.S. sanctions.164
In December 2009, BNPP became aware of U.S. law enforcement
concerns about BNPP’s potential sanctions violations.165 During the
course of that investigation and those that followed, BNPP not only
failed to correct mistakes it made, but continued to engage in the very
conduct that lead to the initial investigations.166
In 2010, BNPP had another chance to comply with the demands
of U.S. financial regulators.167 BNPP told regulators that it was
conducting an internal investigation into its compliance with U.S.
sanctions and promised to cooperate with United States and New York
regulators.168 Instead of cooperating, BNPP, once again, continued to
conduct transactions on behalf of Iranian Controlled Company 1—in
direct violation of the MOU entered into with regulators in 2004.169
Even after the DOJ investigation began in December 2009, BNPP
continued to conduct dollar-clearing transactions for Iranian clients until
November 2012.170
BNPP’s failure to provide information to the DOJ complicated
the investigation. An exhibit to the Deferred Prosecution Agreement
includes an entire section on “BNPP’s Failure to Timely Provide
Relevant Information to the Government.”171 The DOJ specifically
references BNPP’s failure to provide meaningful documentation and
materials from BNPP Geneva until May 2013, almost four years after
the investigation began.172 Had BNPP cooperated with investigators as
opposed to dragging its feet once the investigation began, the almost $9
163. Id.
164. Id. ¶ 36.
165. Id. ¶ 71.
166. Id. ¶ 69.
167. BNP Paribas, Consent Order Under New York Banking Law § 44, supra note 80,

at 11.
168. Id at 11–12.
169. Id. at 12.
170. BNPP Statement of the Facts, supra note 26, ¶¶ 44, 71.
171. Id. ¶ 71.
172. BNPP Statement of the Facts, supra note 26, ¶ 72.
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billion sanction against BNPP might have been reduced.173
VI. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE SETTLEMENT
Although the facts of BNPP’s violations of U.S. trade sanctions
are unique, the resulting settlement has important lessons for other
foreign banks with operations in the United States. Beyond showing the
reach and zeal of U.S. regulators, previous settlements and the BNPP
settlement show that regulators value banks cooperating with
investigations and taking actions to recognize and rectify prior
mistakes.174 Unlike HSBC and Credit Suisse, BNPP did not cooperate
with the OFAC investigation and actually continued to conduct
transactions once the investigation began.175 According to Deputy
Attorney General Cole, “[BNPP’s] failure to cooperate had a real
effect—it significantly impacted the government’s ability to bring
charges against responsible individuals, sanctioned entities and satellite
banks. This failure together with [BNPP’s] prolonged misconduct
mandated the criminal plea and the nearly $9 billion penalty that we are
announcing today.”176
Current financial filings show that as of July 2014, six banks
were under investigation for or have been approached by U.S.
regulators about activities similar to those undertaken by BNPP.177 For
these banks and others with branches inside the United States, the most
important things to take away from the BNPP settlement and the
previous settlements are the importance of cooperation with
investigations, ownership of previous failures, and continued vigilance
over compliance with U.S. laws and audits of previous transactions.178
173. Shane Strowmatt, Fabio Benedetti & Sonia Sirletti, BNP’s $8.97 Billion U.S. Fine
Resets Bar for European Banks, [2014] Banking Daily (BNA) No. 127 (July 2, 2014).
174. See Settlement Agreement, HSBC, supra note 33, ¶¶ 28–29.
175. Compare Press Release, Credit Suisse, supra note 42 (detailing Credit Suisse’s
cooperation with the OFAC investigation), and Settlement Agreement, HSBC, supra note
33, ¶¶ 5–7 (providing details of HSBC’s cooperation), with Strowmatt, supra note 171
(explaining that BNPP continued to conduct transactions after the investigation began).
176. Press Release, BNP Paribas, supra note 76 (quoting Deputy Attorney General
Cole).
177. McCoy, supra note 128.
178. Grayson Yeargin & Lindsey Nelson, BNP Paribas OFAC Settlement – Another
10,
2014, 9:11
AM),
Warning to Banks, LAW360 (July
http://www.law360.com/articles/555440/bnp-paribas-ofac-settlement-another-warning-tobanks.
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Credit Agricole S.A. and Societe Generale S.A., the next two
largest French banks behind BNPP, are both under review for sanction
violations.179 Both of these banks seem to have learned from the
mistakes of BNPP. Unlike BNPP, each of these banks has voluntarily
commenced an internal review of the transactions it has processed and
each appears to be cooperating with OFAC’s investigations.180 As a
result, U.S. regulators will likely be less punitive should the
investigation lead to either a prosecution or settlement.
Germany’s second largest bank, Commerzbank, also seems to
have learned from the mistakes of BNPP. Upon receiving notice of the
investigation from U.S. regulators, the bank turned over its financial
records and voluntarily gave OFAC information on previous
transactions that potentially involved clients in sanctioned countries.181
Germany’s largest bank, Deutsche Bank, is also under investigation for
violations of U.S. trade sanctions.182 Regulators have requested
information “concerning [Deutsche Bank’s] historical processing of
U.S. dollar payment orders through U.S. financial institutions for parties
from countries subject to U.S. embargo laws.”183 As with BNPP, the
only reason these three banks have fallen under U.S. regulators’
jurisdictions is because the transactions went through the banks’ U.S.
branch offices.184
The implications of this detail are unclear, but U.S. regulators
and legislators should watch carefully as burdensome regulation and
trade sanctions could lead to capital flight and a shift away from
conducting major business transactions in U.S. dollars.185 The
supremacy of the dollar and the resulting power it gives to U.S.
financial regulators comes from the primacy of the U.S. dollar in
international trade and debt denomination.186 However, recent analysis
concerning the international use of currency has revealed that other
currencies, such as the Euro, have gained prominence for international
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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transactions, a field of business that has long been the U.S. dollar’s
territory.187 As use of the Euro expands, U.S. regulators should be wary
of creating a burdensome regulatory system that incentivizes foreign
banks to conduct international transactions in currencies other than the
U.S. dollar.188
JASON A. BURNER

Id. at 30.
See Lee, Part II, supra note 12, at 764 (quoting Valery Giscard D’Estaing saying
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